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INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A PROCESS 
Louis B. Sohn* 
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE 
UsE IT. By Rosalyn Higgins. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1994. Pp. 
274. $35. 
The international community is used to receiving path-breaking 
treatises from the pen of Rosalyn Higgins.1 Her first book chal-
lenged the conventional wisdom that only lawyers and tribunals can 
develop international law. It presented the thesis that the political 
organs of the United Nations can also develop international law, 
especially through the practice of interpreting and applying interna-
tional treaties.2 In another series of books Professor Higgins docu-
mented and analyzed the burgeoning practice of the United 
Nations in the area of peacekeeping and thereby helped to crystal-
lize the rules governing this crucial field.3 In Problems and Process: 
International Law and How We Use It, she tackles the even more 
daunting task of examining the various preconceptions about inter-
national law and showing how we can and do use it to solve even 
the most difficult problems. 
Professor Higgins points out that international law has many 
facets and serves a multitude- of purposes. First, international law is 
a "process" that entails hard work in identifying relevant sources 
and discovering applicable norms. It is not a mechanistic process 
but a rational one, taking into account the political and social con-
text. It must be based on decisions made by those authorized to 
make them. In tum, these decisions rely on past decisions as impor-
tant guides, selecting from among available choices those that best 
reflect community interests and promote common values (pp. 8-9). 
Second, international law is a "system," in which "norms" emerge 
either because express consent is given, or because there is no op-
position, or because the opposition has been overcome.4 As she 
* Distinguished Research Professor of Law, National Law Center, The George Washing-
ton University. LLM, 1935, John Casimir University; LLM., 1940; S.J.D., 1958, Harvard. -
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1. Professor of International Law, London School of Economics. 
2. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE 
POIII1CAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963). 
3. ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: DOCUMENTS AND COMMEN· 
TARY (1969-1981). 
4. P. 16. Professor Higgins prefers "nonns" to neutral "rules." See pp. vi, 2-3. As she 
notes elsewhere in the book, international law is not a mechanistic application of rules, with-
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explains, international law is composed of norms that states believe 
to be necessary to guide their relations with each other (pp. 18, 95). 
In discussing the sources of international law, Professor Higgins 
seems to have changed her evaluation of the role of resolutions en-
acted by international organizations in crystallizing international 
norms. In·her 1963 book on the development.of int~mational law 
through the political organs of the United Nations, she pointed out 
that the existence of the United Nations, with an almost universal 
membership, provides "a very clear, very concentrated, focal point 
for state practice."5 In particular, the votes cast by the states and 
the views expressed by them constitute "collective acts" that, when 
"repeated by and acquiesced in by sufficient ij.umbers with suffi-
cient frequency, eventually attain the status of law."6 She admitted 
at the time that it may be difficult to determine at which point "a 
repeated practice has hardened into a rule of law," how large a ma-
jority of votes is required, or whether the acceptance of this practice 
by the major powers would be necessary.7 She concluded that the 
decisive fact would be when a considerable majority of states would 
"regard themselves as legally bound by the practice," as evidenced 
by states' attitudes and public statements.s 
In her new book, Professor Higgins discusses in more detail the 
recent emphasis on United Nations resolutions and points out that 
resolutions are only a limited part of the nonnative efforts of inter-
national organizations. What matters is the whole process of deal-
ing with complex legal issues - exchanging views and taking 
positions publicly, expressing reservations on views taken by others, 
and preparing drafts intended to become legal instruments in the 
form of treaties, declarations, binding resolutions, or even codes 
(pp. 23-24). All these activities end in a decisionmaking process 
that may or may not imply a legal view upon a particular issue. It is 
important to distinguish between binding . and nonbinding resolu-
tions (pp. 24-25), and between resolutions on current topics quickly 
pushed through by a majority and nonnative declarations of con-
temporary international law (pp. 25-26). While Professor Higgins 
discusses various views on the subject (pp. 26-28), she barely men-
tions the process that has evolved in recent years in which the Gen-
eral Assembly approves declarations that were considered carefully 
by a broad-based working group over a period of years, declara-
tions that took account of various minority views, produced a docu-
out regard to context; it is "a system that can assist in the avoidance, containment, and reso-
lution of disputes." P. 56. 
5. HIGGINS, supra note 2, at 2. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 5-6 
8. Id. at 6. 
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ment satisfactory to various groups of states, and resulted in a 
declaration that could be approved by consensus, unanimity, or 
without a vote (p. 28). The best example of such a carefully pre-
pared law-making resolution is the Declaration on Principles of In-
.ternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions,9 which was prepared over a period of seven years by a special 
committee, approved by the General Assembly in 1970, and cited as 
a binding instrument by the International Court of Justice in 
Nicaragua v. United States of America.10 
The chapter that best illustrates Professor Higgins's approach to 
international law is the one dealing with human rights.11 She 
strongly rejects the contention that there can be no fully universal 
concept of human rights because of the great diversity of cultures 
and political systems in the world. The human rights standards are 
not just Western standards to be imposed on other nations. She 
believes, profoundly, that human rights are human rights. Individu-
als everywhere want the same essential things: to have sufficient 
food and shelter; to be able to speak freely; to practice their own 
religion or to abstain from religious belief; to feel that their person 
is not threatened by the state; to know that they will not be tor-
tured, or detained without charge, and that, if charged, they will 
have a fair trial. She is certain that there is nothing in these aspira-
tions that is dependent upon culture, religion, or stage of develop-
ment (pp. 96-97). 
Consequently, economic, social, and cultural rights are as im-
portant to her as the traditional civil and political rights. She points 
out that, from the perspective of the holder of the right, the entitle-
ment to free primary education is as clear as the entitlement to be 
free from torture (pp. 99-102). To the argument that civil and polit-
ical rights require only abstention from prohibited conduct, while 
economic and social rights require specific action by the state, she 
responds that several civil rights also impose positive duties on the 
state. For instance, the right to fair trial and access to the courts 
requires not only keeping the doors of the court open to all, but 
also the provision of information about legal services, the holding 
of courts in accessible locations, and, in some circumstances, the 
provision of legal aid (p. 100). Similarly, the prohibition against 
torture requires educating the police and the guards, making them 
familiar with the international Standard Minimum Rules for the 
9. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 
{1970). 
10. P. 37 {discussing Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J., at 
99-100 (June 27)). 
11. See ch. 6 (entitled "Responding to Individual Needs: Human Rights"). 
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Treatment of Prisoners,12 and, if the rules are violated, vigorously 
prosecuting and appropriately punishing violators of these rules (p. 
101). 
In the chapter on the United Nations (ch. 10), Professor Higgins 
also emphasizes that the maintenance of international peace, the 
settlement of disputes, and the promotion of social, economic, and 
humanitarian welfare are considered by the United Nations Charter 
as parts of "a seamless web" (p. 169), If nations cannot settle dis-
putes, peaee is endangered; if injustice and economic and social 
deprivation prevail, the results are social instability and interna-
tional terrorism (p. 169). 
This view also prevails in the United Nations. In his 1994 re-
port, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, pointed out that "the definition of security is no longer 
limited to the questions of land and weapons. It now includes eco-
nomic well-being, environmental sustainability and the protection 
of human rights; the relationship between international peace and 
security and development has become undeniable."13 Returning 
later to this issue, the Secretary-General emphasized that "[t]he gap 
between international aspirations for the enjoyment of human 
rights and the widespread violations of these rights presents the ba-
sic challenge to the United Nations human rights programme."14 
He suggested that "[t]o close this gap, the world community must 
identify and eliminate the root causes of violations,"15 and that the 
United Nations must increase efforts "to implement the right to de-
velopment, to define better and ensure greater respect for eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, and, at the most fundamental 
level, to improve the daily life of the individual."16 
1\vo issues that are connected with human rights are the self-
determination of peoples and the protection of minorities. Profes-
sor Higgins is critical of the reference to "the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples" in Articles 1 and 55 of the 
United Nations Charter,17 because it has been misinterpreted over 
12. The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were adopted in 1955 
by the first United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crimes and the Treatment of 
Offenders. They were approved by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
in 1957 and 1977. For the text of the Rules, see 1 UNITED NATIONS, CENTER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHI'S, HUMAN RIGHrS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 243 (1993). 
For U.S. decisions applying these Rules, see Loms HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 632 (3d ed. 1993). 
13. BoUIROS BoUIRos-GHAu, BUILDING PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT, 1994: REPORT 
ON THE WORI{ OF THE ORGANIZATION FROM THE FORTY-EIGHIH TO THE FORTY·NIN1H SES-
SION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2 (1994). 
14. Id. at 137. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55. 
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the years (pp. 111-12). The original purpose of this phrase was to 
protect peoples and states against interference from other states. 
She observes that while this phrase has helped more than a hundred 
dependent territories to acquire independence, quite often the new 
governments of these territories do not grant their peoples free 
political institutions (p. 120). Unlike the Charter, Article 1, as is 
common to two 1966 covenants on human rights,18 defines "the 
right of self-determination" as a right that allows each people to 
"freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development."19 This right is spelled out 
even more clearly in the Helsinki Fmal Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe,20 which provides that by vir-
tue of this right "all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, 
to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external 
political status, without external political interference, and to pur-
sue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural 
development."21 
As far as protection of minorities in international law is con-
cerned, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations in its provisions on self-determination 
includes a paragraph against the right of secession, opposing "any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the ter-
ritorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
states .... "22 This provision, however, also makes clear that it is 
intended to protect only those states that possess "a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory \vithout 
distinction as to race, creed or colour."23 Citing the work of the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee that supervises the im-
plementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Profes-
sor Higgins points out that the right of self-determination requires 
that a free choice be afforded to the peoples, on a continuing basis, 
as to their system of government, in order that they can determine 
their economic, social, and cultural development (p. 120). 
18. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 
1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
19. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 18, at 5; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 18, at 173. 
20. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, Declara-
tion on Principles Guiding Friendly Relations Between Participating States, § VIII, 14 I.L.M. 
1292, discussed at pp. 114-15. 
21. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, supra note 20, at 1295. 
22. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, supra 
note 9, at 124. 
23. Id. 
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As long as a government treats its minorities properly, protects 
all their basic human rights, including the right of nondiscrimina-
tion, and grants to persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguis-
tic minorities "the right, in community with other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, and to use their own. language[,]" the minorities would 
have no basis for seeking secession.24 Conversely, the desire of a 
group for secession - to form an independent state or to join with 
another group or unit elsewhere - will be at its most intense when 
that group's human rights are being suppressed. Professor Higgins 
compares that situation with the parallel problem when individuals 
desire to exercise their right to leave their country because their 
human rights are being violated. Similarly~ it is not surprising that 
the desire of ethnic and other groups to break away is most noticea-
ble when they are oppressed (p. 124). Professor Higgins concludes 
that an international lawyer should eschew fashionable trends when 
they are intellectually unsound and should concentrate on provid-
ing the analysis that would show that the principle of self-determi-
nation, properly understood, can serve common values (p. 128). 
Professor Higgins presents a similar thoughtful examination of a 
host of other problems. She_ discusses the managem~nt ·of natural 
resources, the mining of deep' sea-bed minerals, sharing .the water of 
international rivers, and exploiting petroleum resources on land 
and on the continental shelf (ch. 8). She examines the accountabil-
ity and liability of a state for acts or omissions that violate interna-
tional law (ch. 9). She describes the role played by the United 
Nations in the progressive development of international law and its 
codification, in the peaceful settlement of disputes, and in maintain-
ing international peace and security through collective action (ch. 
10). She examines the limited use of the International Court of Jus-
tice and the ways of increasing resort to it (ch. 11 ), as well as the 
importance .of increasing the participation of domestic courts in the 
interpretation and application of international law (ch. 12). 
She examines, and is rather critical of, international tribunals' 
resort to equity - for instance, when applied in settling disputes 
about maritime boundaries - and proportionality, especially when 
applied to the use of force (ch. 13). Finally, she discusses the use of 
force by states in self-defense (ch. 14), and the increased use of 
force by the United Nations, especially for humanitarian purposes 
(ch. 15). 
Professor Higgins achieves her objective - to depart from the 
traditional style of the genei:al course~ in international law given at 
the Hague Academy of International Law and to offer instead her 
24. Pp. 124-25 (quoting and discussing International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 27, supra note 18, at 179). 
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own perspectives and ideas. It is a rich harvest, and it should stimu-
late many discussions. She maintains a balance between being con-
troversial and critical, on the one hand, and being a pioneering 
problem-solver, on the other hand. It is not surprising that the 
American Society of International Law, has already awarded its 
Certificate of Merit to her for this book in appreciation of her "cre-
ative scholarship. "25 
25. ASIL NEWSLETTER (Arner. Soc. Inter. L., D.C.), Mar.-May 1995, at 3. 
